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Summary
Various  scientists  under  the label  of “Scientists  for  a democratic  Europe”  (SDE) sent  a
joint “Letter to the governments of the EU member states” (2007) advising the use of the
Penrose  Square  Root  Weights  (PSRW)  for  the  EU  Council  of  Ministers.  When  we
compare  the  SDE letter  with  Colignatus  (2001,  2007b)  “Voting  theory  for  democracy”
(VTFD)  then we find  that  SDE does  not  fit  voting theory for  democracy. Inspection of
the  material  upon  which  the  SDE  letter  is  based  also  shows  a  moral  choice  while  the
rigorous  empirical  analysis  by  Gelman,  Katz  and  Bafumi  (2007)  is  actually
misrepresented.  So the  SDE letter  can also  be rejected  on its  own grounds. The  PSRW
approach seems not valid for (indivisible) individuals but may be applicable for divisible
shares in shareholder meetings.
Introduction
Various  scientists  sent  a  joint  letter  to  the  governments  of  the  EU  member  states,  i.e.
“Scientists for a democratic Europe” (2007), henceforth called SDE. A key paragraph of
SDE is:
“The basic democratic principle that the vote of any citizen of a Member States 
ought to be worth as much as for any other Member State is strongly violated both 
in the voting system of the Treaty of Nice and in the rules given in the draft 
Constitution. It can be proved rigorously that this principle is fulfilled if the 
influence of each country in the Council is proportional to the square root of its 
population. This is known as ‘Penrose’s Square Root Law’. Such a system may be 
complemented by a simple majority of states.”
This  present  paper  will  consider  this  paragraph  and  its  statements  while  using  the
approach  in  Colignatus  (2001,  2007b)  “Voting  theory  for  democracy”,  henceforth
VTFD. The conclusion reached is that acceptance of VTFD implies rejection of SDE, or,
conversely,  that  if  you  accept  SDE  then  you  would  reject  VTFD.  Given  that  science
aspires at unanimity on truth, and in this case on what would be optimal, it will be useful
to develop the issue.
It  may  be  superfluous  to  remark  that  scientists  can  only  offer  advice  and  that  our
(democratically  elected)  parliaments  take  the  decisions.  Personally,  I  find  it  useful  to
emphasize  the  distinction  by  using  the  name  Colignatus  for  my  scientific  work  while
retaining the original  birth name for the other realms in society. The SDE initiative can
be appreciated, since, when a scientist notices that arguments in a debate are distorted, it
is  an  option  to  provide  unsollicited  advice.  In  the  same  way,  if  advice  was  provided
once, but you revise your analysis, then it would be proper to notify the advised body of
this  revision.  The  overall  issue  of  the  role  of  scientific  advice  for  economic  policy
making  has  been  discussed  in  Colignatus  (2005),  henceforth  DRGTPE,  with  the
suggestion of  an Economics  Supreme Court,  and this  is  a  useful  setting  for  the  present
discussion as well.
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In the  following,  we will  summarize VTFD,  review the  position  of  SDE, compare,  and
finally  draw  the  conclusions.  The  reason  to  start  this  discussion  with  VTFD  is  that  its
approach  may  be  less  familiar  for  proponents  of  the  Penrose  Square  Root  Weights
(PSRW).
Summary of VTFD for this discussion
The following summary of VTFD is targetted for the present discussion and will differ a
bit  from  the  summary  on  the  book  cover  text  that  has  an  overall  and  less  specific
purpose. Points to consider here are:
  1.  Democracy is rooted in fundamental human characteristics as discussed by Hart 
(1961, 1967) “The concept of law”. To understand democracy we require a rich 
theoretical setting and a historical understanding of the subject, and it does not 
suffice to use a simple mathematical model for only one aspect. Voting is seen 
in the context of an economic system where there are also other instruments 
such as bargaining and the management of information.
  2.  The basic notion is the protection of minority rights by veto power (such as 
property rights), and, for the non-vetoed remainder, the “one man, one vote” 
approach with proportional representation. The basic decision rule is unanimity 
to the extent that a person can veto the infringement upon his or her rights. 
Majority rule can be used when unanimity results into a deadlock (i.e. when 
more options survive all possible vetos). 
  3.  Key implementation issues concern the multiplicity of parties and options, the 
possibility of cheating (“strategic voting”), the optimal use of information, the 
principal-agent problem (does a party what it has been elected for ?), the issue 
of formation of parties, and bargaining before and after an election. VTFD 
recognizes this real world situation.
  4.  Within this general setting, VTFD technically concentrates on solving the 
“direct single seat election” where voters directly select one item out of a list of 
items. The voters can be organized in groups that have different weights. In this 
setting, the principal-agent problem has been defined away. Here, voters select a 
president discounting the risk that he or she may not keep promisses. The 
groups are defined by their agreement on a single preference list for the items. 
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The technical development in VTFD stops here. Thus, VTFD emphasizes the 
complexity of real world situations but has a technically limited implementation.
  5.  Though VTFD technically does not discuss indirect elections (multiplicity of 
seats, formation of parties, principal-agent problem and dynamic consistency, 
separation of powers, two chambers, the role of information), it is fairly 
straightforward to extrapolate some results in the case of proportional 
representation, at least conceptually. It is not clear whether it would be so useful 
to extend the analysis to indirect elections since these would depend very much 
on the local ideosyncracies. These local conditions are discussed in the 
applicable literature.
  6.  VTFD is embedded in the overall analysis of Colignatus (1992b, 2005). This 
finds that the role of information is undervalued within Montesquieu’s Trias 
Politica model. A conclusion is that it would be better to create a separate 
constitutional power, namely an Economic Supreme Court that is rooted in 
science. 
  7.  A major point in VTFD is that economic theory since Arrow (1950, 1951, 
1963) has been misdirected towards impossibilities instead of finding the 
optimal solution for voting for democracy. VTFD presents a better 
interpretation for Arrow’s difficulty and suggests the solution of the Borda 
Fixed Point method for direct single seat elections. Economic science has been 
cynical about democracy and at times openly favouring dictatorship. However, 
with the misinterpretation of Arrow’s finding out of the way, the road is open 
for more democracy (not only political bodies but also other bodies in society).
Scientists  can only advise.  Taking account  of  various  properties  of  voting schemes and
empirically observable sentiments it would appear to be a good advice to take the Borda
Fixed  Point  method  as  the  optimal  scheme  for  direct  single  seat  elections.  With  the
above  in  mind,  Coligatus  (2007h)  is  a  recent  application  of  this  analysis  to  the  recent
elections in France. That paper summarizes the main finding as follows:
“What would be a proper democratic voting system ? Given the widely differing 
opinions of voters and the long lists of candidates, it is generally advisable to use 
indirect representative democracy and proportional representation. In parliamentary 
elections, parties advocate their preferences, the popular vote determines party sizes, 
whereupon the elected party professionals can arrive at the final choice of the 
executive by using both bargaining and more complex voting schemes, in particular 
the Borda Fixed Point method. In this manner the information overload is reduced, 
both for voters who don’t have to think about long lists of candidates and for voting 
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mechanisms that don’t have to calculate with millions of different preferences. 
Representative democracy also allows for bargaining that allows for optimal 
compromises.”
Jointly,  VTFD  and  DRGTPE  also  provide  some  other  insights  on  democracy.  Solving
unemployment would be a major contribution towards democracy since people under the
fear  of  unemployment  might  be  misguided  by  that  fear.  Conversely,  a  less  democratic
system  would  enhance  unemployment.  Since  there  is  no  economic  need  for  mass
unemployment,  its  existence  indicates  that  (national)  decision  making  is  insufficiently
democratic. Also, in a bicameral system the first chamber (Senate) should focus more on
the  defence  and  abuse  of  minority  veto  rights  by  the  second  chamber  (Congress).
Another  observation  is  that,  in  a  democracy,  it  is  not  fair  to  exclude  minorities  from
government.  Rather  than  seeing  a  dichotomy  between  a  ruling  coalition  and  an
opposition,  we  should  regard  the  executive  and  the  legislative  as  different  functions.
Rather  than  forming  ruling  coalitions  and  excluding  an  opposition,  we  should  have  an
executive  that  mirrors  all  parties  (of  sufficient  size),  while  the  legislative  provides  for
the  checks.  The  prime  way  to  achieve  this  is  to  enhance  voter  power  and  the  popular
sense  of  democracy,  such  that  voters  can  express  disapprovement  when  parties  do  not
respect  minority rights and when parties turn co-operative bargaining in factional power
politics.
The  best  way to  increase  the  power  of  the  electorate  and  to  reduce  the  principal-agent
problem  is  likely  by  having  annual  elections.  The  current  political  circus  at  election
times arises from the fact that elections are not held frequently enough, and with annual
elections  the  general  attitude  will  become  more  matter  of  fact.  The  recent  French
phenomenon  of  having  four  elections  within  a  few  months  (presidential  and
parliamentary,  first  round  and  second  round)  is  grossly  inefficient  and  democratically
disruptive  compared to  a  single  parliamentary  election  with  proportional  representation
and  Borda  Fixed  Point  selection  of  the  executive  by  parliament.  You  may  note  the
different  approaches.  The  current  approach  starts  with  the  doctrine  that  executive  and
legislative  have  to  be  chosen  by  the  people  at  different  moments  in  time.  The  French
then  noted that  this  may result  into  powers  of different  political  sentiment  and national
paralysis - the French “cohabitation”. (One contributing cause is non-proportionality that
can enhance such mood swings.) Subsequently, the French sought a remedy by ordering
the  elections  such  that  there  arises  a  powerful  executive  and  obedient  legislative.  The
VTFD approach starts  with the doctrine that there are more objectives  to satisfy so that
one should not elevate one objective to a starting point. One condition is proportionality.
Another condition is the balance of powers. Another condition is that the powers should
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work  together  and  not  against  each  other.  Another  condition  is  minimal  work  and
maximal use of information. The solution emerges that has been stated in above quote.
The position of SDE in favour of the Penrose 
Square Root Weights
A representative  body like  the  EU Council  of  Ministers  indeed  faces  the  situation  that
Malta  with  400,000  inhabitants  sits  at  the  same  table  with  Germany  with  82,500,000
inhabitants, i.e. 211 times as large. In the US, one might compare California and Hawaii,
and  in  the  UN one  might  compare  China  or  India  with  Malta  again.  The  multiple  seat
problem is  not  the  same as  the  single  seat  problem and one can admire Lional  Penrose
for his wonderful analysis and John F. Banzhaf III for rediscovering it.
For an econometrician, the clearest account of the Penrose Square Root Weights is given
by  Gelman,  Katz  and  Bafumi  (2004)  who  are  critical  of  its  assumptions.  Slomczynski
and  Zyczkowski  (2007)  refer  to  Gelman  et  al.  (2004)  but  do  not  properly  answer  the
criticism.  Kirsch (2007 ?) corroborates  the finding by Gelman et al.  (2004) but opts for
the Square Root Weights anyhow. I checked the Gelman et al.  (2004) finding and since
Kirsch  (2007 ?)  states  that  he corroborates  their  finding as  well  I have not  checked the
particulars  of  Kirsch  (2007 ?).  Kirsch  approaches  the issue from the angle of statistical
physics, has the SDE letter on his website, and might be regarded as a key proponent in
SDE. An early discussion was already by Leech (2002), which paper does not contain a
reference  to  the  issue  of  the  assumptions,  which  issue  was  subsequently  raised  by
Gelman  et  al.  (2004).  These  mentioned  papers  state  that  the  Penrose  result  was
independently rediscovered by Banzhaf, and that  all  that Banzhaf presented can also be
found  in  Penrose’s  publication.  Personally,  I  do  not  have  copies  of  the  original
publications  by  Penrose  and  Banzhaf  but  above  authors  (and  other  texts  not  all
mentioned) are sufficiently unanimous on the description.  The Penrose result is called a
“Law” by some but it is better to call it an “idea” and it suffices to use the label PSRW.
The Penrose approach switches focus from “one person, one vote” to another condition,
namely  to  “give  every  citizen  of  the  EU  the  same  influence  on  decisions”  where  the
latter  influence  is  also  called  “being decisive” and can also be called  “Penrose (voting)
power”.  Note  that  VTFD  uses  “voting  power”  as  a  fuzzy  notion  but  mainly  for  the
frequency  of  elections  (yearly  or  four-yearly).  Thus  “Penrose  voting  power”  should
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rather  be  abbreviated  to  “Penrose  Power”  and  not  to  the  fuzzy  “voting  power”.
Properties are:
  1.  The focus is on the coalitions that can be formed with a (qualified) majority. 
  2.  There are two stages: one is the population that provides the (square root) 
weights, and the other are the representatives (or one with the block weight) 
who apply that (qualified) majority rule (without principal-agent problems).
  3.  The problem is considered for one issue, assuming that this holds for all issues 
without interaction. An issue has only two options (yes / no) and there are not 
more options that would create the problems known from Kenneth Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem.
  4.  Under independent random voting, the voters get equal “Penrose power” when 
populations are represented at the second stage with the weight proportional to 
the square root of the population size. Alternatively, under assumptions that 
occur in practice (clusters, traditions), proportional weights are optimal (which 
is the new result of Gelman et al. (2004) and corroborated by Kirsch (2007 ?)).
This summarizes the position of proponents of the Penrose Square Root Weights. There
are  many  more  pages  and  authors  but  these  don’t  change  this  core  idea.  The  SDE
preference for PSRW comes not only from the moral choice for decisiveness above “one
man, one vote” but also from assuming independent random voting. 
There are some additional arguments. One is that the square root would be “transparant”
and  provide  a  “general  rule”,  stable  under  any kind of  enlargement  of  the  EU,  without
the need for additional discussion. This seems to neglect that proportionality is a similar
transparant  general  rule.  A  new  argument  is  by  Slomczynski  and  Zyczkowski  (2007)
who argue that a 62% qualified majority (also called “quota” by them) would be a fairly
consistent  requirement for  the EU with square root weights. It would hold when weight
and “Penrose voting power” are the same. It is not explained why this condition ought to
hold either technically or morally.
Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2004) are critical of the PSRW. The summary of their article
can  be  fully  restated:  “Voting  power  indexes  such  as  that  of  Banzhaf  are  derived,
explicitly or implicitly, from the assumption that all votes are equally likely (i.e., random
voting).  That  assumption  implies  that  the  probability  of  a  vote  being  decisive  in  a
jurisdiction  with n  voters is proportional  to 1/ 
è!!!
n .  In this article the authors show how
this hypothesis has been empirically tested and rejected using data from various US and
European  elections.  They  find  that  the  probability  of  a  decisive  vote  is  approximately
proportional to 1/n. The random voting model (and, more generally, the square-root rule)
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overestimates  the  probability  of  close  elections  in  larger  jurisdictions.  As  a  result,
classical  voting power indexes  make voters  in large jurisdictions  appear  more powerful
then  they  really  are.  The  most  important  political  implication  of  their  result  is  that
proportionally weighted voting systems (that is, each jurisdiction gets a number of votes
proportional  to  n)  are  basically  fair.  This  contradicts  the  claim  in  the  voting  power
literature that weights should be approximately proportional to 
è!!!
n .”
Kirsch (2007 ?) states:  “It does not come as a surprise that we obtain a square-root law
for  a  model  with  independent  voters  (...)  However  as  the  coupling  between  voters
exceeds a certain threshold, the fairest representation in the council is no longer given by
votes  proportional  to  
è!!!!!!
Ni  but  rather  by  votes  proportional  to  Ni.  (...)  ”  As  said,  I
checked the  results  of  Gelman et  al.  (2004),  as likely did the  referees  of the BJPS, and
Kirsch (2007 ?) corroborates it.
We should note how the proponents of the Square Root Weights react to the criticism by
Gelman et al. (2004). 
Slomczynski and Zyczkowski (2007:2) state: 
“Note that this [i.e. their / TC] approach is purely normative, not descriptive: we are 
interested in the a priori voting power arising from the voting procedure itself. The 
actual voting power depends on the polarisation of opinion in the voting body and 
changes from voting to voting (...)”.
This reaction is not adequate. Consider an opinion poll on views on climate change. S &
Z say that they interviewed 1000 trees and that those were 69.4% against climate change
and  5.1%  don’t  knows.  You  say:  “But  these  are  trees  !  You  don’t  apply  a  method
intended  for  people  to  non-people  !”  S  &  Z  react:  “So  what,  our  approach  is  purely
normative,  we  don’t  have  to  check  whether  our  respondents  were  trees  or  whatever.”
Perhaps this example is exaggerated but it indicates the point that one shouldn’t confuse
the  issue  of  applicability  with  the  issue  of  morality.  A  safe  conclusion  is  that  these
authors  don’t  really  respond  to  the  Gelman  et  al.  (2004)  criticism.  It  may be  observed
that  Gelman  et  al.  (2004)  also  state  that  proponents  of  the  Square  Root  Weights  are
being normative and not empirical, but it would not be correct to reduce their criticism to
only  that.  The  point  is  that  a  theory  also  should  be  adequate  before  you  start  applying
norms.
Kirsch (2007 ?:14) states: 
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“To design a nonhomogeneous voting system for a constitution in the light of our 
results is a question of different nature. Even knowing the correlation structure of 
the countries in question exactly would be of limited value to design a constitution. 
Constitutions are meant for a long term period, correlation structures of countries on 
the other hand are changing even on the scale of a few years. One might argue that 
modern societies have a tendency to decrease the correlation between their 
members. In all modern states, at least in the West, the influence of churches, 
parties, and unions is constantly declining. In addition to this it seems more 
important to protect small countries against a domination of the big ones than the 
other way round. This motivates us to choose a square-root law in these long term 
cases.”
The latter position is more sophisticated than the earlier but the few last lines still  are a
giant leap from a theoretically small probability model (that takes the body of the paper)
towards  conclusions  on  constitutional  law  for  ages  to  come.  Gelman  et  al.  (2004)
provide  empirical  evidence  that  deviations  from  the  random  voting  model  are  the  key
property of practical elections. Yet, Kirsch (2007 ?) holds ex cathedra that any empirical
result  still  would  be  random  (where  the  qualification  “in  the  long  run”  is  without
substantiation  and  where  it  is  not  said  that  Gelman  et  al.  (2004)  would  not  have
constitutional law in mind as well).
A  point  to  observe  is  that  this  literature  seems  to  lose  the  distinction  between  the  two
chambers of parliament. The SDE letter concentrates on the EU Council of Ministers but
its  logic  might also  apply  the  the  EU parliament.  PM. Some papers  mention the  use  of
block  voting,  i.e.  that  all  weight  goes  for  the  single  vote  and  cannot  be  distributed.  It
would  seem  that  this  is  not  a  requirement  for  the  original  model,  as  presented  by
Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2004). However, it would hold naturally for the EU Council
of Ministers where a Member State has only one voice with a weight. 
Another point to observe is that the Penrose model, as restated by Gelman et al. (2004),
contains some elements that don’t always apply. It uses only two parties and has “winner
takes  all”  district  voting.  One  might  want  to  see  this  adapted  to  more  parties  and
proportional  representation.  Likely  this  would  not  change  much  about  the  point  that
parliament  could  form  a  majority  coalition,  but  it  blends  in  with  the  observation  that
some coalitions may come about more naturally than others. Also, their regression where
they corroborate  the  case  of  the  Square  Root  Weights  under  the  assumption of  random
voting still shows a large dispersion so that the square root result also comes about from
a specification that has few parameters and few explanatory variables.
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Comparison of the two approaches
We  discussed  the  Penrose  idea  while  already  referring  to  alternative  points  of  view.
These  alternative  points  were  merely  provided  to  clarify  the  Penrose  idea.  Let  us  now
consider the critical issues.
Let us first recall the key paragraph of SDE:
“The basic democratic principle that the vote of any citizen of a Member States 
ought to be worth as much as for any other Member State is strongly violated both 
in the voting system of the Treaty of Nice and in the rules given in the draft 
Constitution. It can be proved rigorously that this principle is fulfilled if the 
influence of each country in the Council is proportional to the square root of its 
population. This is known as ‘Penrose’s Square Root Law’. Such a system may be 
complemented by a simple majority of states.”
With respect to this key paragraph of SDE:
  1.  It is not proven rigorously that equal Penrose power is served by the Square 
Root Weights. Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2004), checked by me, likely checked 
by the referees and editors of BJPS, and corroborated by Kirsch (2007 ?) show 
that for practical situations the equal Penrose power is served by 
proportionality. Thus, precisely the opposite has been proven rigorously. It may 
also be observed that key papers of the SDE group, Slomczynski and 
Zyczkowski (2007) and Kirsch (2007 ?) take positions in morality and propound 
issues ex cathedra, which is fine in terms of developing hypotheses for futher 
research but which cannot be presented as results already attained.
  2.  The basic democratic principle is “protection of minority rights, and for the 
remainder: one person, one vote”. Thus, the basic democratic principle is not 
“the vote of any citizen of a Member States ought to be worth as much as for 
any other Member State”. It is OK that these authors propose that the EU adopts 
another principle but it is not OK that they suggest that this already has been 
adopted. When Penrose wrote his article in 1946 it was an illuminating 
contribution since it provided another angle on the issue of voting power but it 
is incorrect to suggest that he changed the principle of “one man, one vote”. 
Indeed, Penrose didn’t change much, Banzhaf had to rediscover the issue, and it 
still is not commonly accepted. Authors on the Penrose Square Root Weights 
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should stop their rhetoric on what “the” basic democratic principle is and should 
adapt their statements to its common definition.
  3.  There is no ‘Penrose’s Square Root Law’. There is only a mathematical 
theorem that if you have various assumptions then square root weights would 
satisfy some criterion. How that criterion and these assumptions relate to 
democracy is a complex issue, witness this paper.
  4.  The statement “Such a system may be complemented by a simple majority of 
states.” is confusing and may have been included without proper thought. It is 
confusing since a state is a unit with a weight of 1. The standard Penrose 
derivation uses 50% + 1 of the votes and not of the states. The papers 
considered here don’t seem to do this differently (with Slomczynski and 
Zyczkowski (2007) making it 62% but still using votes and not states).
Next there is the overall relation to the analysis in VTFD.
The  SDE  misrepresent  the  issue  of  the  protection  of  minority  rights.  These  rights  are
essentially protected by veto power (e.g. property rights) and it would be wrong to forget
about  veto  power  and  replace  this  by  some  weights  and  a  qualified  majority  rule.  For
example,  take  a  country  with  100  districts  with  (predominantly)  whites  and  4  districts
with  (predominantly)  blacks,  and  assume  that  there  is  a  problem  with  discrimination.
Then SDE suggest to solve this problem by assigning 10 votes to the whites and 2 votes
to the blacks. One wonders why these intelligent people think that this solves anything.
A  hypothesis  is  that  the  SDE  participants  mainly  come  from  countries  that  have  a
“winner  take  all”  way  of  thinking  and  a  mentality  that  emphasizes  majority  coalition
power. To some extent that is merely realistic, since, for example, assigning 100% of the
votes to 1% of  the population  definitely  expresses  a  shift  in power.  But,  properly seen,
the  SDE  approach  focusses  on  a  phenomenon  that  is  a  distortion  of  true  democracy.
They  try  to  meddle  with  that  distortion  but  actually  still  allow  for  it,  since  in  their
approach, the reweighted EU Council of Ministers would still be allowed to fully elbow
out  reweighted  minorities.  As  such  behaviour  is  a  distortion  of  democracy,  the  best
remedy is to refocus on democracy instead of trying to meddle with that distortion.
To  understand  this,  it  helps  to  consider  the  question  why  Germany  with  82.5  million
people would want to sit at one table with Malta with 0.4 million people. There are basic
economic issues, like the ease of travel and the prevention of cross-border crime, capital
flight,  tax  evasion,  infectious  diseases  and  the  like.  It  is  also  a  derived  issue,  in  that
Germany is linked to Italy and Italy is linked to Malta. And there is a sense of common
history  and destiny.  Thus,  crucially,  Malta  has bargaining power,  and the weight that  it
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exerts at the table reflects that bargaining power. From this it follows that once the basic
rights  of  Malta  and  Germany  have  been  respected,  that  there  is  no  obvious  need  to
elaborate on the bargaining power that already exists. 
The  SDE focus  on one issue,  which is  perhaps the best  that  one can achieve in science
with  authors  who  fly  out  in  all  kinds  of  directions,  but  singling  out  this  issue  (and
distorting  it)  is  misrepresenting  the multiplicity,  sizes and order  of the real  problems in
current  representative  democracy.  These  rather  are:  (a)  distortion  of  information  (the
need  for  an  Economic  Supreme  Court),  (b)  the  principal-agent  problem  (frequency  of
elections),  (c)  non-proportionality  (use  of  districts)  in  major  countries  like  France  and
the  UK, (d)  the  mentality of  “winner take all”  coalition  formation (wrong education on
the  meaning  of  Arrow’s  impossibility  theorem),  (e)  co-ordination  of  the  national
parliaments with various international bodies (neglect of Jan Tinbergen’s analysis of the
optimal order).
The SDE letter also contains these statements:
“The experts on voting theory agree that the Treaty of Nice gives too much power to 
a number of countries while others obtain less power than appropriate.”
“We urge our politicians to take into consideration the contribution of the scientific 
community to this issue.”
These  statements  suggest not  only that  voting theory has  reached a  unanimous point  of
view but also that there is a level playing field so that all voices have been heard and all
relevant  questions  answered.  Both  suggestions  are  misplaced.  The  capacity  of  the
scientific  community  to  integrate  different  approaches  is  severely  limited.  Scientific
research groups are fragmented, like small fiefdoms with their own agendas and hobbies,
in  the  best  case  targetted  towards  publication  in  journals,  but  still  limited  by  those
conventions  and  hobbies,  and  that  type  of  scientist  cannot  be  assumed  to  be  aware  of
what  it  takes to run a continent.  In fact,  this  episode again provides an example for  the
parliaments  in  the  world  that  it  is  advisable  to  consider  a  constitutional  amendment on
installing an Economic Supreme Court, to warrant adequate scientific advice.
Speaking as the scientist Colignatus, I can observe that citizen Cool thinks that the issue
of national sovereignty is misstated in the EU debate. This particular citizen thinks that it
would  be  wiser  to  dress  down  the  EU  ambitions,  have  countries  first  improve  their
democracy at  home (see (a)  to (d)  above), and have the EU concentrate  on creating the
economic space with enlargement with Russia and Turkey. For scientist Colignatus these
are  interesting  hypotheses  for  research  and  much  more  important  than  the  PSRW.  For
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example,  when  we  use  the  model  of  a  proportionally  representative  parliament  who
elects  an executive, and apply this to an EU that is mainly an economic space and not a
federation,  then  this  issue  of  “voting  by  country”  does  not  arise  since  votes  in  the
economic  space  would  be  along  party  lines  and  not  countries.  The  crux  would  be  to
create such an economic space such that this would be possible.
The square root idea can be used from the angle of information management. If we apply
proportional  numbers  of  seats  in  a  parliament  then  Malta  would  have  1  seat,  Germany
211, and the EU parliament perhaps becomes too large for the sheer size of numbers. We
might  allow  Germany  15  seats  with  still  the  total  weight  of  211,  creating  manageable
numbers of delegates. This might be combined with a shift attention to the Europe of the
regions,  fostering  the  reduction  of  national  sentiments  and  separation  along  national
lines.  For  purposes  like  these,  the  square  root  is  a  function  that  has  advantages  in
transparancy compared to other functions, see Colignatus (2003).
A  final  point  to  note  is  that  the  Penrose  Square  Root  Weights  can  also  be  applied  to
shareholder  meetings  in  companies.  For  voting  theory  we  have  a  sound  moral  base  in
individual integrity (excluding animals and plants) and arrive at “one person, one vote”.
For  shareholders  we  might  wonder  about  the  divisibility  of  money.  Shares  not  only
express  the  shares  in  profits  and  losses  but  may  also  express  voting  shares.  In  this
economic realm it might make more sense to use the Penrose voting power concept, and
the  aspiration  of  equal  decisiveness.  It  would  seem  to  have  economic  value  to  have
shareholder  voting  shares  that  reflect  the  Penrose  voting  power.  Holding  shares  while
knowing  that  you  will  have  no  influence  due  to  some  other  coalition,  would  be  less
attractive, unless you are only piggy-backing on the business sense of that other coalition
(and then belong to it).  Perhaps one can derive the result from a homogeneity condition
that  voting with a coalition  must be like shifting the weights.  Thus, the rejection  of the
PSRW  is  only  limited  to  representative  democracy  and  not  necessarily  for  other
applications.
Conclusions
We  considered  the  SDE  “Scientists  for  a  democratic  Europe”  (2007),  “Letter  to  the
governments of the EU member states”, and compared this with my book VTFD “Voting
theory for democracy” (2001, 2007b). 
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This comparison shows that SDE does not fit voting theory for democracy. 
When we consider  the material  upon which the SDE letter  is  based then we find moral
choices  and  a  misrepresentation  of  rigorous  empirical  analysis.  Thus,  SDE can  also  be
rejected just for itself. 
The comparison with VTFD clarifies that there is little scope to repair the SDE approach
and points into directions for useful research.
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